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This

response

and

answer

is submitted

to Appellees'

Petition for Rehearing as requested by the Court of Appeals.
I. ARGUMENT
A.

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Ordering that the
Judgment be Reformed Because the Trial Court Employed an
Improper Measure of Damages.
In its memorandum decision, this Court correctly held

that the trial court erred in determining the amount of benefit
conferred by plaintiffs on defendants.
trial

court

improperly

based

its

As this court noted, the

conclusion

of

law

regarding

damages on the amount invested by plaintiffs, rather than on the
value of the benefit conferred on defendants.
Such an error by the trial court is the only possible
source of the $180,000.00 figure contained in its conclusions of
law.

One of the court's findings of fact was that "approximately

$180,000.00

was

plaintiffs."
which

paid

directly

(R. 582).

equalled

the

or

indirectly

to

defendants

by

The court then translated this figure,

exact total

of the various

sums

it

found

plaintiffs had invested in the venture, into a conclusion of law
regarding

the

defendants.

value

of

the

benefits

plaintiffs

conferred

on

In doing so, the court failed to employ the proper

measure of damages for an action based on unjust enrichment, which
is "the value of the benefit conferred

on the defendant

(the

defendant's gain), and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff."

Davies

v.

Olson,

746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah. App. 1987).

1

This

Court was thus correct in holding that the trial court erred in
calculating the amount of the judgment.
B.

Even if the Trial Court Attempted to Employ the Proper
Measure of Damages, Its Failure to Make Requisite
Findings of Fact is Reversible Error.
In their petition for Rehearing, plaintiffs seem to argue

that it is just a coincidence that the $180,000.00 benefit which
the trial court concluded was conferred

on defendants matches

precisely the amount the court found plaintiffs invested in the
venture.

Seizing on two particular items of damages they un-

successfully sought to recover at trial, plaintiffs now contend
that the trial court arrived at the $180,000.00 figure not by
totalling the amounts plaintiffs invested, but rather by considering

in

its

conclusions

of

law

certain

benefits

conferred

on

defendants which the court neglected to detail in its findings of
fact.

This

contention

advanced

to justify

the trial

court's

incorrect judgment is both factually and legally untenable.
First, the argument fails on its face because, even if
these particular benefits had been conclusively proven at trial to
have been conferred on defendants (which they were not) , the sum of
their respective values does not equal the difference between the
$128,761.00 outlined in the trial court's findings of fact and the
$180,000.00 specified in its erroneous conclusion of law.

Had the

trial courz in fact been considering the items plaintiffs allege,
it would have used the amounts identified by plaintiffs to arrive
at a more precise total of plaintiffs' damages.
2

Moreover,

at

this

stage

of

the

appeal,

plaintiffs

conveniently abandon additional items of alleged damages which they
claimed previously, so as to come as close as possible to the trial
court's $180,000.00 figure.

Plaintiffs argued at trial that they

actually conferred on defendants a benefit of $194,469.00.
P-64) .

(Ex.

The fact that the trial court used the round number of

$180,000.00 in its conclusions of law indicates that it was relying
specifically on the amount the evidence showed had been invested,
and not on the value of any benefits conferred.
Furthermore, even if the court understood the proper
measure of damages, it failed to make specific findings of fact in
support of the $18 0,000.00 figure.

A failure to enter adequate

findings of fact on material issues may be reversible error.
v.

Mutual

of

Omaha Ins.

Co.,

776 P.2d

896, 899

Reid

(Utah 1939).

Plaintiffs argue that if the facts pertaining to an issue are
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment, a failure to make findings of fact on that
issue is harmless
(Utah 1983).

error.

Kinkella

v.

Baugh,

660 P. 2d 233, 236

Plaintiffs then conveniently select two particular

items of damages which they sought at trial, the combined value of
which happens to roughly approximate the difference between the
amounts contained in the trial court's findings of fact and in its
conclusions of law, and draw the conclusion that factual findings
on these

items

should

simply be

implied

pertaining to them was uncontroverted.
3

because the

evidence

Even

Indulging

plaintiffs'"

unwarranted

assumption

that

t h e s e a r e t: h e m y s t e r I o u s in :i s s 11 i g e 1 e in e n t s o:!: :i a in a g e s • : i i ; , il: :s j : 1 i 11: i =
court relied, their assertion that the evidence on these Items was
unccntroverted is simply n:t tr;e.

control c: o_e

restaurant: was one

contested ty defer_Gar.es at tria

"he valu~ ~ ~ the funds used ty

*

~ms most: vigorously

defendants presented evidence

spent, and did not receive a benefit from the goods purchased with
them.

Ccntrarv t

Plaintiffs' assertions

defendants mainta"* ^ed a-*-

irem 6 cf plaintiffs' Exhibit 64, not just tht-: iim sun steam table,
and the1- offered evidence to substantiate this claim.

(R. 575,

Similarly, there was controverted evidence pertaining to
the alleged benefit from, f "
Lerer.da.-.t^ :-... ->-. • .- .

c

' c ".69 SBA 1 oan payment as well.

"-

.

: -cot t recei /ed this amount of

money from an unspecified source, not from the plaintiffs.
"0'/) .

(R.

"*h^ w = ^> --^^our.- ~~ -.•-—- --r-. r-p^cv. war drawn was controlled
. i-.. ^ .

by bet:

3"

.

..

- A.:..;

---u c_:AjAied money deposited

Eecause of this fact, defendants argued at

trial that oblicra^iono satisfied from this G""ur.~ were paid at
--^
Included

^:e::;.m::.

reference to t. __ _ a n payment was

In defendants'' proposed

4

findings of fact only

because

corollary findings compensating defendants for their deposits to
the account were also requested,
C.

Plaintiffs7 Arguments Are Based
Reversal of the Burden of Proof.
As illustrated

on

an

Illegitimate

above, there was substantial

evidence

controverting the benefits plaintiffs alleged to have conferred on
defendants but which were absent from the trial court's judgment.
Plaintiffs' recommendation that this Court supply missing elements
of alleged damages on which the trial court failed to make findings
is entirely inappropriate.
The burden of proof in an action for unjust enrichment is
on the plaintiff to establish the value of the benefit conferred on
the defendant.

See

Zitterkopf

v.

(Wyo. 1989); 66 Am. Jr. 2d Restitution
(1973).

Bradbury,

783 P. 2d 1142, 1144

and Implied

Contracts

§ 164

Plaintiffs' argument that this Court should simply assume

the requisite findings unless they were sufficiently disproven by
defendants illegitimately reverses this burden.

This Court was

therefore correct in concluding that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to make requisite findings on controverted issues in support of its conclusions of law.
II.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants request that this
Court deny appellees' Petition for Rehearing.
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DATED this 4th day of April, 1996,
Respectfully submitted,
IDERSON & SMITH, L.C.

£&_>

Robert M. Anderson
Attorneys for Appellants/Defendants
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